Sri Lanka's Human Rights Crisis

The resumption of war between the Sri Lankan

government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

(LTTE) has been accompanied by widespread human

rights abuses by both sides. While the LTTE has continued

its deliberately provocative attacks on the military and

Sinhalese civilians as well as its violent repression of

Tamil dissenters and forced recruitment of both adults

and children, the government is using extra-judicial

killings and enforced disappearances as part of a brutal

counter-insurgency campaign. The likely results will be

the further embitterment of the Tamil population and a

further cycle of war, terrorism and repression. Without

ignoring or minimising the serious violations of the

LTTE, the international community needs to bring

more pressure to bear on the government, through UN

mechanisms, a reappraisal of aid policies and intensified

political engagement. The alternative is a further decline

into authoritarianism, violence, terrorism and repression.

Civilians are repeatedly caught up in the fighting. More

than 1,500 have been killed and more than 250,000

displaced since early 2006. There have been hundreds of

extrajudicial killings, and more than 1,000 people are still

unaccounted for, presumed to be the victims of enforced

disappearances. Hundreds more have been detained under

newly strengthened Emergency Regulations that give the

government broad powers of arrest and detention without

charge. The security forces have also expelled hundreds

of Tamils from Colombo. Forces commanded by the ex-

LTTE commander Karuna, leader of the Tamil Makkal

Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) now aligned with the

government, engage in child recruitment, extortion,

abductions for ransom and political assassinations.

While many deaths result from military clashes, the army

– assisted by pro-government Tamil paramilitaries – is

also engaged in a deliberate policy of extrajudicial killings

and abductions of Tamils considered part of LTTE’s

civilian support network. Targeted assassinations have

been particularly frequent in Jaffna and parts of the east,

often victimising civilians with no connection to the LTTE.

Political killings, abductions and disappearances have

also spread to Colombo, where abductions for ransom

have targeted both Tamils and Muslims.

 

Tamils are increasingly fearful and alienated from a

government that claims to be liberating them from the

LTTE but has failed to promote any viable political

solution to the conflict. The violence and abuse suffered

by many Tamils has ensured increased support and

funding for the insurgents.

 

The counter-insurgency campaign is leading to more

authoritarianism in the country as a whole. Officials now

routinely brand their political critics and human rights

advocates as LTTE sympathisers, while political opponents

and journalists have been arrested under the Emergency

Regulations. What began as an effort to target LTTE

supporters shows disturbing signs of becoming generalised

repression of dissent. While routinely attacking moderate,

democratic forces, the government has given free rein to

Sinhalese nationalist groups.

 

For the most part the government has responded to

criticism with denial, obfuscation and virulent, verbal

attacks on its critics. In an attempt to deflect international

criticism, it has also established new institutions to

investigate allegations of human rights abuses. A

Presidential Commission of Inquiry (CoI), backed by a

panel of international observers, is investigating a series

of atrocities. However, the history of such institutions in

Sri Lanka is grounds for scepticism: previous commissions

have been ineffective in stopping abuses or prosecuting

perpetrators.

 

In any case, the CoI is no substitute for proper action by

the law enforcement agencies and judiciary to investigate

and prosecute abuses. The national Human Rights

Commission is deeply flawed and has lost all credibility

after being stocked by political appointees. Other domestic

institutions are increasingly politicised or dysfunctional,

leading to calls for an international human rights

monitoring mission, which may be the only way to end

the present wave of abuses. The international community

has responded to the renewed conflict and human rights

abuses, however, in a disjointed and lacklustre way. While

there has been some public criticism, there is little sign

of a coordinated approach that would put real pressure

on the government to change course.

 

If the government does not begin to reassert the rule of

law, it may find itself unable to bring under control the

violent forces that have been unleashed – including the

TMVP, other Tamil paramilitaries and criminal elements.

The nature of the campaign against the LTTE has spawned

a rise in general lawlessness. Democratic state institutions

are increasingly threatened by the development of a

regime that is becoming more authoritarian.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 

I. INTRODUCTION

 

II. HOW NOT TO FIGHT AN INSURGENCY

 

III. A SHORT HISTORY OF IMPUNITY

A. THE FAILURE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

B. COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY

C. THE CEASEFIRE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

 

IV. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE NEW WAR

A. CIVILIANS AND WARFARE

B. MASSACRES

C. EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS

D. THE DISAPPEARED

E. ABDUCTIONS FOR RANSOM.

F. FORCED RECRUITMENT BY TAMIL MILITANTS

G. ARRESTS AND DETENTIONS UNDER THE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS

H. ATTACKS ON THE MEDIA

I. POLITICALLY MOTIVATED ARRESTS/HARASSMENT

J. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

 

V. THE STATE RESPONSE

A. POLICE INVESTIGATIONS AND THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

B. THE POLITICAL RESPONSE .

C. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL AND THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS

D. AD HOC COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY

 

VI. THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

A. PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES

1. Conflicts of interest.

2. Witness protection

3. The political context

4. Indictments and prosecutions

B. INTERNATIONAL INDEPENDENT GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS (IIGEP)

C. PROSPECTS

 

VII. HALTING THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL

A. THE GOVERNMENT’S CHALLENGE

1. The seventeenth amendment

2. The emergency regulations

3. Paramilitaries

4. Extrajudicial killings and abductions

5. Longer-term legal and institutional reforms

 

B. THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

 

C. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

1. UN mechanisms

2. Pressure on child soldiers

3. Pressuring the LTTE

 

VIII. CONCLUSION

 

APPENDICES

A. MAP OF SRI LANKA

B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

C. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA

D. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES