Desperately Seeking Sanity: What Prospects for a New Beginning in Zimbabwe?

There are two PDF files. The first PDF file contains a number of pictures that are evidence of violence against people during the election period.

The second PDF file does not contain these pictures.

Executive Summary

1.      The Presidential run-off election on the 27^th June 2008 took place against the background of the worst state- led violence that Zimbabweans have experienced since the Gukurahundi massacres of the mid 1980’s, and in the context of a SADC mediation that had failed to ensure a generally acceptable election process. 

2.       This report draws upon 3320 formal interviews with victims of human rights abuses over the last three months. This figure represents a fraction of those directly affected by violence, the majority of whom are likely to have failed to access appropriate medical assistance.  

3.      The violence of May and June 2008 differs from previous phases of election violence in that unlike previous elections the violence did not taper off in the weeks leading to the election.   

4.      There have been 106 confirmed murders in the last three months, with clear indications that the number will grow as more information comes to light.

5.      The most common form of murder in every month was abduction followed by death with known activists being abducted from their homes, at road blocks or elsewhere.

6.      Many of these abductions followed by slow or quick execution fit the criteria for enforced disappearances, a particularly pernicious for of extra judicial killing with severe long-term consequences for families and communities. Families are left without closure, being thus deprived of the basic human right to mourn their dead, and the possibility of being forcibly ‘disappeared’ strikes terror into the hearts of communities.

7.      This pattern of abduction followed by assassination has not been common in Zimbabwe in the last ten years. However it was prevalent during the 1980s Gukurahundi killings in Matabeleland.

8.      The 100 year old pattern of impunity for state perpetrators in Zimbabwe has unsurprisingly been maintained during the violence of 2008.

9.      The youth militia was the overwhelmingly most common perpetrators of violence, while the Joint Operation Command (JOC) has continued to play key roles in overseeing and orchestrating the violence.

10.  The combined ZANU PF paramilitary forces of militia, war vets and supports accounted for 82% of the violence, while the MDC/other category accounted for 1% of the violence.

11.  Most of the violence (77%) was reported in the three Mashonaland provinces and Harare. In Mashonaland East and Central in particular, wards and villages that had shown a high MDC vote were mercilessly targeted, in what can be described as both a policy of punishment for ‘betraying’ Zanu PF, and a pre-emptive strike ahead of the run-off, to turn the tide against Morgan Tsvangirai.

12.  18% of victims held leadership positions in their communities, while 43% claimed MDC affiliation. 1% claimed Zanu PF affiliation. Moreover Zanu PF had a recognizable policy of attacking not just key people in the MDC leadership, but also targeting their families.    

13.  During May and June there was a notable shift of the violence to Harare. Youth militia bases were set up across the city, in both high and low density suburbs.              

14.  80% of the victims were aged between 21 and 60, with 10% of the victims under 10 years old.

15.  Reprisal attacks by MDC members amounted to a fraction of the assaults, murders and destruction of property by Zanu PF supporters.

Source: "Desperately Seeking Sanity: What Prospects for a New Beginning in Zimbabwe? ", this is the executive summary of the report.

Abbreviations  
Executive Summary

PART I
Overview of political events since 29 March 2008
1.    Introduction  
2.    The Presidential Run-Off Election of 27th June 2008 
3.    The SADC Mediation and International Pressures 
4.    Recommendations  

PART II:
Political violence: April to June 2008 
1.    Background 
2.    Sources 
3.    Delays and difficulties of trying to access or deliver health care
4.    Difficulties and Dangers in trying to access information and offer help 
5.    Deaths and Enforced Disappearances
6.    Impunity for ZANU, Arrests for MDC  

The Violence
1.    Perpetrators over time
2.    Scale and geographical spread of the violence 

The Strategy
1.    Targeting ZANU strongholds 
2.    Targeting MDC strongholds 
3.    Targeting of Leadership and Election Officials 
4.    “Operation Tsuronegwenzi” – “attack both the hunted and those who shelter them”
5.    Operation “How to Vote” and “Red Finger” 

The Victims: age, violations, injuries
1.    Age of victims
2.    Types of violation and resulting injuries  
3.    Gender based violence  
4.    Retaliatory violence 

Challenges of the Present and the Future1.    Putting the genie back into the bottle2.    Healing the community fabric 

Appendices:
Memorandum of Understanding between ZANU and the two MDCs