Mexico's National Human Rights Commission. A critical assessment.

The National Human Rights Commission (Comision Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, CNDH), Mexico’s official human rights organ, is failing to live up to its

promise. The CNDH has made some valuable contributions to human rights promotion in Mexico over the years, providing detailed and authoritative information

on specific human rights cases and usefully documenting some systemic obstacles

to human rights progress. But when it comes to actually securing remedies and

promoting reforms to improve Mexico’s dismal human rights record, the CNDH’s

performance has been disappointing.

 

The CNDH’s principal objective is to ensure that the Mexican state remedies human

rights abuses and reforms the laws, policies, and practices that give rise to them.

Given the pervasive and chronic failure of state institutions to do either, the CNDH is

often the only meaningful recourse available to victims seeking redress for past

abuses. It is also, potentially, the most important catalyst for the changes that are

urgently needed in Mexico to prevent future human rights violations.

 

The CNDH’s failure to carry out these functions effectively has not been due to a lack

of resources. The CNDH’s 2007 budget of approximately US$73 million is by far the

largest of any ombudsman’s office in the Americas and one of the largest in the

world. It has over 1,000 employees, including knowledgeable and experienced

professionals who are genuinely committed to promoting human rights. Nor has the

problem been the CNDH’s mandate, which is broadly defined to include both

“protecting” and “promoting” human rights, or its legal powers, which provide

ample tools to pursue this broad mandate.

 

Rather, the reason for the CNDH’s limited impact has been its own policies and

practices. The CNDH has not made full use of its broad mandate and immense

resources. It has routinely failed to press state institutions to remedy the abuses it

has documented, to promote reforms needed to prevent those abuses, to challenge

abusive laws, policies, and practices that contradict international human rights

standards, to disclose and disseminate information it has collected on human rights

problems, and to engage constructively with some key actors who are seeking to

promote human rights progress in Mexico.

 

The CNDH could play a far more active role in improving the human rights situation in

Mexico. But for an institution of this kind to be a catalyst for change, rather than

merely a chronicler of the status quo, it must be resourceful, creative, proactive, and

persistent in promoting solutions to the country’s human rights problems.

 

CNDH investigators have demonstrated such resourcefulness in their efforts to

document abuses. For example, the Second Investigative Unit (visitaduria)

conducted extensive research in the aftermath of police crackdowns in Guadalajara

in 2004 and Atenco in 2006, providing an authoritative and detailed account of

serious human rights violations in both instances. The Third Investigative Unit

carried out a comprehensive evaluation of the country’s prison system in 2006,

using a carefully crafted system of indicators to evaluate conditions in 191 prisons.

The Fifth Investigative Unit has sought to overcome the difficulties of documenting

abuses against migrants by establishing offices in key locations throughout the

country in recent years, thereby making it easier for these victims to denounce

violations and for the unit to investigate the denunciations effectively.

 

CNDH officials have also, in some instances, been proactive in promoting reforms to

address these problems. The Fifth Investigative Unit, for example, has carried out

effective campaigns to expand press freedoms in Mexico. The unit’s advocacy

played an important role in bringing about the passage of legislation to protect

journalists from having to reveal their sources in 2006 and to decriminalize

defamation in 2007.

 

Unfortunately, as this report documents, this proactive approach to human rights

promotion has not been replicated in many areas of the CNDH’s work. This report’s

findings are based on extensive interviews with 38 CNDH officials, including its

current president and high level officials in all substantive areas of work, as well as

with various former CNDH employees, including all former CNDH presidents. The

findings are also drawn from extensive interviews and consultation with representatives from local nongovernmental organizations, which have played an essential role in monitoring the CNDH’s work since its creation, and with

representatives from state human rights commissions, lawyers, journalists, scholars,

and leading members of Mexican civil society. Finally, the findings draw upon

interviews with numerous victims and relatives of victims of human rights violations.

 

Human Rights Watch’s goal in issuing this report is to provide a fact-based analysis

of the reasons the CNDH has not fulfilled its promise, as well as concrete, realizable

recommendations on how these deficiencies can be remedied. We hope the

analyses and recommendations offered here are useful to CNDH officials, Mexican

government officials, and Mexican civil society groups and individuals concerned

about human rights and the performance of the CNDH.

I - Summary and Recommendations

Remedies

Reform

Publicity

Collaboration

Accountability

Recommendations

To the CNDH

To the Senate Human Rights Commission

 

II - Background

The CNDH’s Origins

The CNDH’s Mandate, Structure, and Methods

The CNDH’s Contribution to Human Rights Promotion

 

III - Mexico’s Obligations Under International Law

Obligation to Provide a Remedy

Obligation to Inform

Victims’ Right to Participate

Applicability to the CNDH

 

IV - Remedies

Failing to Follow Up: Paradigmatic Cases

Crimes of the “Dirty War”

Crackdown in Guadalajara

Crackdown in Atenco

Murders of Women in Ciudad Juarez

How the CNDH Limits Its Own Mandate

Rejected Recommendations

Accepted Recommendations

“Special Reports” and “General Recommendations”

A Peculiar Interpretation of the “Legality Principle”

 

V - Reform

How the CNDH Limits Its Own Mandate

Military Jurisdiction over Human Rights Cases

Discrimination against Military Officers Living with HIV

Access to the Airwaves (The “Televisa Law”)

Reproductive Rights in Mexico City

Torture

Juvenile Detention Centers

When the CNDH Pushes for Change

 

VI - Publicity

Concealing Information on Abuses through “Conciliation”

Uncertain Benefits of Non-Disclosure

An Unnecessary Price for Conciliation

Conciliating Serious Human Rights Abuses

Applying Broad Confidentiality Norms

 

VII - Collaboration

Human Rights Victims

A Policy of Exclusion

Other Human Rights Bodies

UNHCHR.

The Executive’s Human Rights Office

State Commissions

 

VIII - Accountability

The Need for Accountability

Independent Accountability Mechanisms

The National Congress

The Advisory Council

Federal Superior Auditor

Transparency

Incomplete Public Disclosure..

Applying Broad Confidentiality Norms

Prohibitively High Costs for Copies

Limited Review Mechanism

 

Acknowledgements